Political Violence as Commitment Problem

Existence of a social contract ensures cooperation among ethnically-diverse groups, especially when they are characterised by power asymmetries. Alternatively, constitution or any other form of social contract is meant to ensure resource and power sharing mechanisms in ethnically-diverse societies. In this regard, adherence to the commitments accentuated in the contract is Pareto superior outcome that not only prevents exploitation by the powerful group but also mitigates the risk of rebellion by the minority groups. A break-down arises when, in the presence of power asymmetries, the dominant coalition has an incentive to renege on the social contract by appropriating more than the agreed-upon share of resources. In this study, we focus on this aspect by exemplifying it with the issue of Balochistan, Pakistan, which is an important saga of deprivation and political violence. We utilise the post constitutional game-theoretic analysis of Kirstein & Voigt (1999) to establish the need for accountability for reneging on the social contract and then contextualise the framework for the case of Balochistan. We posit that while the existence of a formalised social contract in the form of a constitution is necessary, it is not sufficient for ensuring lasting peace. In other words, it is always essential to protect the constitution through ensuring accountability for violating its terms and commitments. We conclude that the recent surge in political violence in Balochistan highlights the urgent need for the country’s leadership to implement the 18th Constitutional Amendment, address Baloch grievances, and ensure that initiatives like the Peaceful Balochistan Programme to prevent civil conflict and uphold constitutional rights

Accountability · Constitution · Incentive · Politics · Power (physics) · Social contract · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence