A scoring rule and global inaccuracy measure for contingent varying importance

Bibliographic Data

ID21370641
AuthorsPavel Janda (0000-0003-0438-6679, Politecnico di Milano, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume180
Issue12
Pages3323-3352
Publication date2023-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-023-02028-z
OpenAlexW4387101978
LanguageEN
References cited18

Levinstein recently presented a challenge to accuracy-first epistemology. He claims that there is no strictly proper, truth-directed, additive, and differentiable scoring rule that recognises the contingency of varying importance, i.e., the fact that an agent might value the inaccuracy of her credences differently at different possible worlds. In my response, I will argue that accuracy-first epistemology can capture the contingency of varying importance while maintaining its commitment to additivity, propriety, truth-directedness, and differentiability. I will construct a scoring rule — a weighted scoring rule — and a global inaccuracy measure that has all four required properties and recognises the contingency of varying importance. I will show that Levinstein’s and my results coexist without contradicting each other

Construct (python library) · Contingency · Data mining · Differentiable function · Epistemology · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Measure (data warehouse) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Pure mathematics · Truth value · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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