Amodal completion and relationalism

Bibliographic Data

ID21370664
AuthorsBence Nanay (0000-0002-2835-6530, University of Antwerp, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume179
Issue8
Pages2537-2551
Publication date2022-08-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-022-01777-7
PMID35854974
OpenAlexW4224980545
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited100

Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable

Amodal perception · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Modality (human–computer interaction) · Object (grammar) · Perception · Philosophy of mind · Relation (database) · Representation (politics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Multisensory perception and integration · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms

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