The explanation of logical theorems and reductive truthmakers

Bibliographic Data

ID21370809
AuthorsYannic Kappes (0000-0002-8065-2935, Universität Hamburg, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume178
Issue4
Pages1267-1284
Publication date2021-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-020-01474-3
OpenAlexW3033382504
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited18

This paper first identifies several plausible desiderata on satisfactory explanations of logical theorems, shows that ordinary grounding explanations cannot satisfy them and argues that there is reason to believe that no alternative grounding explanations of logical theorems can be given. It then develops an alternative explanation of logical theorems based on Yablo’s (Aboutness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014) idea of reductive truthmaking. The resulting proposal invokes instances of reductive truthmaking that bear an interesting structural similarity to the notion of zero-ground, in virtue of which it is able to satisfy the identified desiderata

Epistemology · Linguistics · Logical conjunction · Logical consequence · Mathematical economics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Similarity (geometry) · Virtue · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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