To lie or to mislead

Bibliographic Data

ID21370889
AuthorsFelix Timmermann (University of Zurich), Emanuel Viebahn (0000-0001-5747-2269, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume178
Issue5
Pages1481-1501
Publication date2021-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-020-01492-1
OpenAlexW3035465667
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited29

The aim of this paper is to argue that lying differs from mere misleading in a way that can be morally relevant: liars commit themselves to something they believe to be false, while misleaders avoid such commitment, and this difference can make a moral difference. Even holding all else fixed, a lie can therefore be morally worse than a corresponding misleading utterance. But, we argue, there are also cases in which the difference in commitment makes lying morally better than misleading, as well as cases in which the difference is not morally relevant. This view conflicts with the two main positions philosophers have defended in the ethics of lying and misleading, which entail either that lying is in virtue of its nature worse than misleading or that there is no morally relevant difference between lying and misleading

Commit · Deception · Epistemology · Linguistics · Lying · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Utterance · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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