Stable acceptance for mighty knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371053 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Hawke (0000-0002-6810-7918, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 181 |
| Issue | 6-7 |
| Pages | 1627-1653 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-024-02103-z |
| OpenAlex | W4399437593 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 37 |
Drawing on the puzzling behavior of ordinary knowledge ascriptions that embed an epistemic (im)possibility claim, we tentatively conclude that it is untenable to jointly endorse (i) an unfettered classical logic for epistemic language, (ii) the general veridicality of knowledge ascription, and (iii) an intuitive ‘negative transparency’ thesis that reduces knowledge of a simple negated ‘might’ claim to an epistemic claim without modal content. We motivate a strategic trade-off: preserve veridicality and (generalized) negative transparency, while abandoning the general validity of contraposition. We criticize various approaches to incorporating veridicality into domain semantics , a paradigmatic ‘information-sensitive’ framework for capturing negative transparency and, more generally, the non-classical behavior of sentences with epistemic modals. We then present a novel information-sensitive semantics that successfully executes our favored strategy: stable acceptance semantics , extending a vanilla bilateral state-based semantics for epistemic modals with a knowledge operator loosely inspired by the defeasibility theory of knowledge
Ascription · Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Description logic · Epistemic modal logic · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Modal · Modal verb · Multimodal logic · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Semantics (computer science) · Transparency (behavior) · Verb · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Topic Modeling
Defaults in update semantics
Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality
Epistemic Modals
Knowledge
Replies to Critics
Restriction without Quantification
Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals
Epistemic Modals in Hypothetical Reasoning
Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods
Mighty Knowledge
Might do better
Logic and conversation
Justified belief, knowledge, and the topology of evidence
Why safety doesn’t save closure
Informational dynamics of epistemic possibility modals
Possibility
Epistemic Possibilities
Epistemology Formalized
Expression for Expressivists
Closure and Epistemic Modals
One's Modus Ponens
Connectives without truth tables
Weak Assertion
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |