Sufficientarianism and incommensurability

Bibliographic Data

ID21371111
AuthorsSusumu Cato (0000-0002-4244-7199, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume181
Issue12
Pages3439-3458
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-023-02097-0
OpenAlexW4392655989
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited41

This paper proposes a sufficientarian theory with an interval of sufficiency levels. I assume that there are upper and lower bounds of sufficiency and that all well-being levels in between can be considered sufficiency levels. This interval reflects the vagueness of the concept of sufficiency. According to the proposed principle, a distribution is morally better than another if and only if, for each threshold within the interval, the headcount of those below the threshold under the former distribution is smaller than that under the latter distribution. This necessarily leads to incommensurability in moral relations. I argue that such incommensurability makes sufficientarian principles invulnerable to some fundamental objections

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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