Agent-Neutral Reasons and Contractualist Moral Theory
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371428 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert H Myers (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 539-553 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8191 • E-ISSN: 1469-817X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0031819125100879 |
| OpenAlex | W4416892272 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
Back in 1982, when I started studying with Samuel Scheffler, a major subject of debate was whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – the existence of agent-relative reasons for action justifies making fundamental changes to consequentialist moral theory. How dramatically the tables have turned in the years since! Now the question tends to be whether – and, if so, exactly why and how – agent-neutral reasons for action can have a significant role to play in contractualist moral theory. In the first half of this paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that agent-neutral reasons do exist and that they are more basic than reasons of other sorts. In the second half of the paper, I offer some arguments for thinking that such reasons, being more basic, must have a central role to play in contractualist moral theory
Action (physics) · Action theory (sociology) · Consequentialism · Moral disengagement · Moral philosophy · Moral psychology · Normative ethics · Subject (documents) · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Highly cited | No |
|---|