Argument, Changing Minds, and Persuasion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371623 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew McKeon (0000-0002-1416-241X, Michigan State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 291-310 |
| Publication date | 2026-05-13 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Rhetoric (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8213 • E-ISSN: 1527-2079 |
| Publisher | The Pennsylvania State University Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5325/philrhet.58.3.0291 |
| OpenAlex | W7163024532 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Pinto notes, in effect, that for your change of mind induced by a use of an argument to count as being persuaded by the argument, you must perform the inference that is invited. How is it determined what inference is invited by one’s use of an argument advanced to persuade someone of the conclusion? This essay uses the notion of an inference claim. It highlights how invitations to inference count as meta-argumentation, drawing on Aikin and Casey. Also, the essay shows how an invited inference accords with Mercier and Sperber’s notion of inference featured in their account of argumentative reasoning
Argument (complex analysis) · Argumentative · Inference · Persuasion · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
| Highly cited | No |
|---|