The Aristotelian Robot
Towards a Moral Phenomenology of Artificial Social Agents
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21372202 |
|---|---|
| Authors | E Mendieta (0000-0003-0903-885X), Alan R Wagner (0000-0002-7941-3814) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 327-340 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Today (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8256 • E-ISSN: 2329-8596 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/philtoday202448527 |
| OpenAlex | W4394729643 |
| Language | EN |
In this essay an engineer and a philosopher, after many conversations, develop an argument for why the Aristotelian version of virtue ethics is the most promising way to develop what we call artificial moral, social agents, i.e. robots. This, evidently, applies to humans as well. There are several claims: first, that humans are not born moral, they are socialized into morality; second, that morality involves affect, emotion, feeling, before it engages reason; third, that how a moral being feels is related to some narrative, whether moral or not; and finally, that narrativity is what builds a sense of a “moral” I, namely an authorial moral self
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Feeling · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Morality · Narrative · Narrativity · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Virtue · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |