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The Aristotelian Robot

Towards a Moral Phenomenology of Artificial Social Agents

Bibliographic Data

ID21372202
AuthorsE Mendieta (0000-0003-0903-885X), Alan R Wagner (0000-0002-7941-3814)
Year2024
Volume68
Issue2
Pages327-340
Publication date2024-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Today (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8256 • E-ISSN: 2329-8596
PublisherPhilosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5840/philtoday202448527
OpenAlexW4394729643
LanguageEN

In this essay an engineer and a philosopher, after many conversations, develop an argument for why the Aristotelian version of virtue ethics is the most promising way to develop what we call artificial moral, social agents, i.e. robots. This, evidently, applies to humans as well. There are several claims: first, that humans are not born moral, they are socialized into morality; second, that morality involves affect, emotion, feeling, before it engages reason; third, that how a moral being feels is related to some narrative, whether moral or not; and finally, that narrativity is what builds a sense of a “moral” I, namely an authorial moral self

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Feeling · Moral development · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Morality · Narrative · Narrativity · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Virtue · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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