How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error
A reply to Akhlaghi
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21379197 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daan Evers (0000-0001-7055-930X, Faculty of Philosophy University of Groningen Groningen the Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 146-150 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rati.12329 |
| OpenAlex | W4200487578 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Farbod Akhlaghi has argued that noncognitivists and naturalists cannot explain the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. He thinks this shows that noncognitivism and naturalism are false. I argue that noncognitivists and naturalists have no trouble explaining the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error and that the requirement to explain this possibility is plausible only on one particular conception of epistemic possibility
Epistemology · Naturalism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |