On a neglected feature of moral agency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21379271 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zachary L Barber (0000-0003-1612-9848, Department of Philosophy University of Rochester 532 Lattimore Hall, 435 Alumni Road, PO Box 270078 Rochester NY 14627 USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 68-80 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ratio (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rati.12287 |
| OpenAlex | W3081184209 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate
Agency (philosophy) · Control (management) · Epistemology · Moral agency · Moral disengagement · Moral responsibility · Possession (linguistics) · Sociology · sort · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Highly cited | No |
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