A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics

Bibliographic Data

ID21379285
AuthorsRasmus Jaksland (0000-0001-9531-9994, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities NTNU – Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim Norway, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume36
Issue1
Pages1-10
Publication date2023-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRatio (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/rati.12344
OpenAlexW4283746684
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited32

Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science‐based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science‐based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science‐based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science‐independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics

Economics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies

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