Platonic Simulation Theodicies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21394620 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcus William Hunt (0000-0001-6858-1903, College of Lake County, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 703-720 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Sophia (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-1527 • E-ISSN: 1873-930X |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11841-025-01092-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4415058950 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 19 |
Using Platonic metaphysics, the paper offers eight arguments for the benevolence of the simulator of our world, assuming that it is a simulation. In part, the paper proceeds negatively by showing problems with the hypothesis of a malevolent simulator. First, simulant is to simulator as part to whole, so it is in the interests of the simulator to be just and wise toward the simulant. Second, the simulation hypothesis implies the possibility of religious technology, unless the simulator is virtuous and therefore above manipulation. Third, if the simulator is malevolent then ethics becomes incoherent, given that piety is a virtue. Fourth, unless the simulator is benevolent then no simulant is, since everything done by a simulant is done in cooperation with the simulator. Fifth, the simulator is impassible to simulants, but evil involves passivity. Sixth, the simulator is the singular cause of the world, but evil involves the accidental collision of causes. Seventh, the simulator is eternal with respect to the world, and evil cannot exist in the eternal. Eight, simulating requires knowledge of the forms, but like is known to like, so a malevolent simulator could not create an intelligible world
Accidental · Caliber · Collision · Driving simulator · Piety · Origins and Evolution of Life · Robotics and Automated Systems · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Highly cited | No |
|---|