Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ Existential Assertions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21394937 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alessandro Rossi (0000-0001-8723-7622, University of St Andrews, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 389-409 |
| Publication date | 2021-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Sophia (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-1527 • E-ISSN: 1873-930X |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11841-021-00831-x |
| OpenAlex | W3154681631 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined
A priori and a posteriori · Epistemology · Existentialism · Philosophy of religion · Physics · Power (physics) · Property (philosophy) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |