The dark side of clarity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21395021 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chenwei Nie (0000-0002-6862-8879, Department of Philosophy University of Warwick Coventry UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 429-443 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjp.12592 |
| OpenAlex | W4402710452 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 36 |
We all have experiences in which it “seems clear” to us that something is true. This kind of clear experience can play significant roles in determining whether we believe something to be true. But what are the significant roles? So far, the literature has focused on optimal cases where a person's clear experience might provide prima facie justification for their belief. This article will develop the hypothesis that, in less optimal cases, these clear experiences can be epistemically damaging. Specifically, it will argue that, in certain cases, such experiences may causally compel belief even in the face of counterevidence
Astronomy · CLARITY · Great Rift · Physics · Chemistry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy and History of Science
Truth and Interpretation
Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry
Clear and Distinct Perception
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity
Delusions and theories of belief
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Seemings as sui generis
Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification
Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |