A (new) defense of self‐forgiveness

Bibliographic Data

ID21395029
AuthorsAgnès Baehni (0000-0002-7605-9346, Department of Philosophy University of Geneva Geneva Switzerland, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume63
Issue4
Pages517-532
Publication date2025-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12604
OpenAlexW4405115445
LanguageEN
References cited37

In this article, I try to resolve a contradiction arising from the combination of two theses: (1) self‐forgiveness is sometimes morally justified and (2) only victims can rightly forgive. As has been pointed out by other philosophers, both are plausible, but the two taken together are inconsistent. In the literature, self‐forgiveness is painted as an “imperfect” form of forgiveness or as a “second‐best option” because it entails a violation of the victim‘s prerogative to forgive. So far, this view has not directly been challenged. Instead, philosophers have focused on the task of giving a plausible account of self‐forgiveness while leaving the claim according to which forgiveness is among the victim‘s prerogative unchallenged. In this paper, I argue that self‐forgiveness is largely independent from the victim‘s forgiveness both morally and conceptually

Contradiction · Economics · Epistemology · Forgiveness · Imperfect · Political science · Prerogative · Task (project management) · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access