What's at Stake in the Race Debate

Bibliographic Data

ID21395043
AuthorsRon Mallon (0000-0001-8347-8939, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume60
IssueS1
Pages54-72
Publication date2022-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12480
OpenAlexW4288925122
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited37

How can there be so much apparent disagreement about what race is, when there is so much agreement on the facts surrounding race? In this paper, I develop this puzzle and consider several interpretations of work in the philosophy of race to try to answer it, several ways of understanding what the metaphysics of race is doing. I consider and reject the possibility that apparent disagreement is metaphysically substantive, and I also consider and reject the view that apparent disagreement primarily reflects semantic disagreements. Instead, I suggest that apparent first‐order disagreement over the existence and character of race is a part of a broader, metalinguistic negotiation or conversation about how racial terms can or ought to be used, and I note a range of considerations—including semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, and ethical—that properly play a role in this discussion

Character (mathematics) · Conversation · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Negotiation · Order (exchange) · Race (biology) · Social science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Race, Genetics, and Society