Rousseau's case for democracy
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21395052 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Matthew Schrepfer (0000-0003-1544-2090, Department of Philosophy University of Tennessee, Knoxville Knoxville Tennessee USA, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 619-633 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjp.12605 |
| OpenAlex | W4405116286 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 13 |
In this article, I provide an interpretation of Rousseau's case for democracy: his argument for why “every law which the people in person have not ratified is invalid; it is not a law.” The people must ratify every law because sovereignty “lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation” or alienation. Taking my cue from this remark, I argue that Rousseau's radically free, choice‐based conception of the will makes it impossible for anyone to legitimately agree to submit to a nondemocratic sovereign, explaining why only democracy can be legitimate on his view. However, the principle that “who wills the end wills the means also” means that citizens can, in willing one thing, commit themselves to willing more than they realize. This explains why Rousseau sometimes seem to treat the general will as a fact that citizens can be mistaken about
Alienation · Argument (complex analysis) · Commit · Democracy · Epistemology · General Will · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Popular sovereignty · Representation (politics) · Sociology · Sovereignty · Law · Philosophy · Political Theory and Influence · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |