The very possibility of contemplation

The dialectics of intellect and will in Schopenhauer's aesthetics

Bibliographic Data

ID21395059
AuthorsAlexander Sattar (0000-0002-6033-5166, Department of Philosophy Humboldt University of Berlin Berlin Germany, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume63
Issue1
Pages66-80
Publication date2025-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/sjp.12551
OpenAlexW4390107518
LanguageEN
References cited21

In this article, I explore how Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience—independently of his theory of arts—accommodates the possibility of contemplation. The standard reading of his aesthetics is that contemplation becomes possible because of a certain “surplus” of intellect and facilitating external occasions. I argue, however, that the “essential imperfections” of intellect and Schopenhauer's overall metaphysics are inconsistent with the very idea of will‐less cognition and, hence, of a free intellect. An alternative explanation of contemplation better fits with Schopenhauer's philosophy overall by stating that it is driven by the will itself. I analyze two approaches to elaborating such a theory. First, the “metaphysical” account, according to which the will as thing‐in‐itself brings forth the (surplus of) intellect needed for contemplation as a means of self‐cognition. Second, the “physiological” account, which presupposes a quasi‐evolutionary process that has aesthetic cognition as a byproduct of intellect. The two accounts complement each other and in tandem better explain the possibility of contemplation than postulating a will‐less intellect

Aesthetics · Art · Contemplation · Dialectic · Epistemology · Intellect · Metaphysics · The arts · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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