Dogmatism and perceptual justification
A reason‐theoretic foundation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21395063 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hamid Vahid (0000-0001-9064-0877, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences Tehran Iran, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 655-668 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjp.12526 |
| OpenAlex | W4385806654 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
According to one prominent account of perceptual justification, “dogmatism,” whenever you have perceptual experience as if p , and lack defeaters, you thereby have immediate, prima facie justification for believing that p . The most important challenge is to show how experience can, on its own, provide justification for the belief in its content. Dogmatists often try to meet this challenge by highlighting the phenomenal character of perceptual experience and the mode of presentation of its content and defending their justifying roles by appealing to intuitively plausible examples. What is lacking here, however, is a theoretical framework to sanction and justify those roles going beyond the mere appeal to examples. Finding such a framework is the main goal of this article. I begin by criticizing a prominent response to this challenge, which suggests a composition view of perceptual experience consisting of sensory experiences and seemings. I then highlight the need for a theoretical framework to provide the rationale for the justifying roles that dogmatists allocate to perceptual experience. It is claimed that the framework in question involves the mechanism by which we possess reasons. Adapting the framework to cases where perception functions as a reason, a principled defense of dogmatism is provided
Appeal · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence) · Perception · Political science · Presentation (obstetrics) · Prima facie · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |