Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience

This article considers a largely overlooked phenomenological account of nonconceptual experience that turns on experience having a sense that is unique to intuition, and which can be invoked to explain how we come to view what we experience in objective terms without referring to ready‐made concepts. The two early phenomenologists Edith Stein and Gertrud Kuznitzky are discussed as having elaborated two distinct, yet related, versions of this intuitive sense. My discussion identifies two common assumptions of both philosophers: firstly, the idea that the objective character of intuition hinges on the structure of apprehension, which is found by investigating the regularities of the appearance of objects; secondly, the objective character of intuition presupposes a metaphysical notion of things having a sense in themselves. Importantly, both philosophers do not take this “sense in itself” to be a direct part of the contents of experience, showing objectivity to arise out of intuition instead

Aesthetics · Apprehension · Epistemology · Intuition · Metaphysics · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy

• Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World

  Joseph K Schear•Mind, reason, and being-in-the-worl…•2013

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