On the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21405085 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keiran Sharpe (0000-0003-1263-0969, University of Canberra, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 95 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 539-573 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory and Decision (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5833 • E-ISSN: 1573-7187 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11238-023-09935-x |
| OpenAlex | W4382310761 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
This paper constructs a simple model of decision-making that accounts for the paradoxes of Ellsberg and Machina. It does so by representing decision makers’ beliefs on the vector space $${\mathbb{R}}\times {\mathbb{R}}$$ R × R and by providing a reasonable decision rule with axiomatic foundations. Moreover, the model allows for a characterization that clearly distinguishes between the two paradoxes. The interesting feature of the paper is that the ‘resolution’ of the paradoxes is along the lines suggested by the eponymous authors themselves. This is to say, the decision rule derived from the axioms corresponds to Ellsberg’s own rule in the narrow set of circumstances that he explored, and the decision rule embodies Machina’s injunction that we treat choice under uncertainty in a similar manner to the way we treat standard consumer theory. That the paper cleaves to the advice of both authors is a little surprising given that it utilizes a two-dimensional vector space that neither author deployed
Axiom · Decision rule · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Resolution (logic) · Simple (philosophy) · Space (punctuation) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Mathematics · Philosophy
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque
A Definition of Subjective Probability
A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
Betting on Machina’s reflection example
Ambiguity Models and the Machina Paradoxes
| Highly cited | No |
|---|