Original position arguments and social choice under ignorance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21405395 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thijs De Coninck (0000-0002-1222-7953, Ghent University), Frederik Van De Putte (0000-0001-6828-0107, Ghent University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 275-298 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory and Decision (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5833 • E-ISSN: 1573-7187 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11238-022-09889-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4281933098 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
John Rawls famously argued that the Difference Principle would be chosen by any rational agent in the original position. Derek Parfit and Philippe Van Parijs have claimed, contra Rawls, that it is not the Difference Principle which is implied by Rawls’ original position argument, but rather the more refined Lexical Difference Principle. In this paper, we study both principles in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general format for evaluating original position arguments in this context. We argue that in this format, the Difference Principle can be specified in three conceptually distinct ways. We show that these three specifications give the same choice recommendations, and can be grounded in an original position argument in combination with the well-known maximin rule. Analogously, we argue that one can give at least four plausible specifications of the Lexical Difference Principle, which however turn out to give different recommendations in concrete choice scenarios. We prove that only one of these four specifications can be grounded in an original position argument. Moreover, this one specification seems the least appealing from the viewpoint of distributive justice. This insight points towards a general weakness of original position arguments
Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Distributive justice · Distributive property · Economic Justice · Economics · Epistemology · Ignorance · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Original position · Position (finance) · Positive economics · Veil of ignorance · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
Reply to Alexander and Musgrave
The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen behind the Veil of Ignorance
The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute
A Theory of Justice
V—Fairness
Rawls’s Self-Defeat
Rational choice and the original position
The Veil of Ignorance Violates Priority
Social Choice and the Derivation of Rawls's Difference Principle
Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
Uncertainty and Fairness
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |