Agency and Objectivity
Gomesian Faith or Cartesian Clarity
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21408798 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Elliot Samuel Paul (0009-0009-0123-6924, Queen's University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 273-288 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2025.10043 |
| OpenAlex | W7157158287 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 18 |
Anil Gomes argues in The Practical Self that we must have faith that we are doxastic agents, sustained by commitment to an objective social world. I argue Gomes needs evidence he denies himself. Descartes, whom Gomes rejects, provides what’s missing: we gain defeasible evidence both for objectivity and agency by perceiving them clearly. I reconstruct overlooked Cartesian insights, including his Commonsense Realism. Finally, while Gomes invokes Lichtenberg’s “lightning” to question doxastic agency, I show that Lichtenberg equally addressed passivity in creative insight. The lesson: we need evidence for passivity no less than agency and objectivity—and Cartesian clarity provides it
Agency (philosophy) · CLARITY · Defeasible estate · Denial · Doxastic logic · Faith · Objectivity (philosophy) · Omniscience · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Critique of Pure Reason
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Critique of the Power of Judgment
Iii.—on Referring
The Intellectual Given
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
The Incoherence of Empiricism
Cartesian intuition
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Kant on Perception
How NaÏve Realism can Explain Both the Particularityandthe Generality of Experience
The Complex Tapestry of Free Will
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |