The Rational Partisan
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21408905 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Hedden (0000-0003-4463-9255, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-11 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2025.10016 |
| OpenAlex | W4414218271 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Our politics are increasingly polarised. Polarisation takes many forms. One is increasing clustering, whereby people hold down-the-line liberal or conservative views on a wide range of orthogonal issues. Some philosophers think that such clustering is indicative of irrationality, and so finding yourself in one of several clusters gives you evidence that not all your political beliefs are true. I argue that the reverse is true, presenting a simple model of belief-formation in which finding yourself in one of several clusters of opinion on orthogonal issues should increase, rather than decrease, your confidence that all your beliefs are true
General interest · Politics · Public opinion · Range (aeronautics) · Simple (philosophy) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
An Epistemic Theory of Democracy
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
In defense of moral testimony
Endogenous epistemic factionalization
Rational factionalization for agents with probabilistically related beliefs
Epistemology of Disagreement
Disambiguation of social polarization concepts and measures
What are the chances you’re right about everything? An epistemic challenge for modern partisanship
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |