Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses

Bibliographic Data

ID21409024
AuthorsJörg Löschke (0000-0003-2378-6766, University of Zurich, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume50
Issue4
Pages477-491
Publication date2020-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCanadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/can.2020.3
OpenAlexW3013038954
LanguageEN
References cited62

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism

Consequentialism · Deontological ethics · Economics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Intrinsic value (animal ethics) · Order (exchange) · Positive economics · Relative value · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · War, Ethics, and Justification