Noninferential Antiskepticism and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21409052 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthias Steup (0000-0003-0517-9639, University of Colorado, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 539-551 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/can.2025.10011 |
| OpenAlex | W4412174234 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
How should epistemologists respond to skepticism about knowledge of the external world? Michael Bergmann advocates noninferential antiskepticism. The thought is that, to reply to a skeptical argument, we should start with premises that do not require inference. I argue that Bergmann’s reasoning runs into the problem of easy knowledge and propose an alternative inferential antiskepticism. This view faces the problem of vicious circularity. I agree that, if we go down the inferential path, a certain type of circularity is unavoidable. I deny, however, that this type of circularity is vicious
Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|