Integrating host-country political heterogeneity into MNE–state bargaining
Insights from international political economy
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 21410137 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sumon Kumar Bhaumik (0000-0002-4459-3659, University of Sheffield), Saul Estrin (0000-0002-3447-8593, London School of Economics and Political Science), Rajneesh Narula (0000-0002-4266-2681, University of Reading, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 157-171 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of International Business Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0047-2506 • E-ISSN: 1478-6990 |
| Editora | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/s41267-023-00651-w |
| OpenAlex | W4387338714 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 5 |
| Referências citadas | 65 |
The international business (IB) literature has emphasised the heterogeneity of firm strategies in shaping MNE–state bargaining, but largely ignored the heterogeneity of states. In contrast, the international political economy (IPE) literature provides a more nuanced consideration of state strategies and their economic and political priorities. We seek to address this oversight by making two related contributions. In the context of MNE–state bargaining, we first discuss how differences in political systems and the political and economic objectives of states may affect their negotiating stance with MNEs. We consider the impact of changes in the balance of state objectives by considering how much importance governments assign to improving the welfare of its broader population, relative to how important they are concerned with the “private benefits” that accrue to the political elites. This enables us to add micro-foundations to the characterisation of the state. Second, we apply a Nash bargaining framework to MNE–state negotiations that vividly captures the relative bargaining powers of the MNE and the state, including how “outside options” available to these two actors can influence the shape of actual bargains. We discuss the implications of these two contributions for future research
Bargaining power · Context (archaeology) · Economic system · Economics · International business · International political economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · International Business and FDI · International Development and Aid · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Violence and Social Orders
The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies
Varieties of institutional systems
The Bargaining Problem
A Review of the Nonmarket Strategy Literature
Protection for Sale
The Retreat of the State
Democracy and Development
Comparing capitalisms
Foreign direct investment along the Belt and Road
Ordering Power
Beyond GDP
“Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country
A comment on the multifaceted relationship between multinational enterprises and within-country inequality
Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies
"Political Science and "The Public Interest
Testing the bargaining hypothesis in the manufacturing sector in developing countries
Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival
Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization
Labour Control and Developmental State Theory
The Political Economy of Industrialization
Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 5 |