John von Neumann’s Discovery of the 2 nd Incompleteness Theorem

Shortly after Kurt Gödel had announced an early version of the 1st incompleteness theorem, John von Neumann wrote a letter to inform him of a remarkable discovery, i.e. that the consistency of a formal system containing arithmetic is unprovable, now known as the 2nd incompleteness theorem. Although today von Neumann’s proof of the theorem is considered lost, recent literature has explored many of the issues surrounding his discovery. Yet, one question still awaits a satisfactory answer: how did von Neumann achieve his result, knowing as little as he seemingly did about the 1st incompleteness theorem? In this article, I shall advance a conjectural argument to answer this question, after having rejected the argument widely shared in the literature and having analyzed the relevant documents surrounding his discovery. The argument I shall advance strictly links two of the three letters written by von Neumann to Gödel in the late 1930 and early 1931 (i.e. respectively that of November 20, 1930 and that of January 12, 1931) and finds the key for von Neumann’s discovery in his prompt understanding of the Gödel sentence A – as the documents refer to it – as expressing consistency for a formal system that contains arithmetic

Argument (complex analysis) · Calculus (dental) · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Gödel · Gödel's incompleteness theorems · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Pure mathematics · Sentence · Von Neumann architecture · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Logic, programming, and type systems · Mathematics · Philosophy · Quantum Mechanics and Applications

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