The KK Principle and the Strong Notion of Knowledge
Hintikka’s Arguments for KK Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21451383 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chen Bo (0000-0001-5260-5747, Wuhan University), Bo Chen (0009-0009-0184-3556, Wuhan University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 144-160 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | History and Philosophy of Logic (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0144-5340 • E-ISSN: 1464-5149 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01445340.2024.2309837 |
| OpenAlex | W4391841278 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 57 |
In his Knowledge and Belief (1962), Hintikka establishes his system of epistemic logic with the KK (Knowing that One Knows, in symbols, Kp→KKp) principle (KK for short). However, his system of epistemic logic and the KK principle are grounded upon his strong notion of knowledge, which requires that knowledge is infallible, that is, it makes further inquiry pointless, and becomes ‘discussion-stopper’; knowledge implies truth, to wit, cognitive agents will not be mistaken in their knowledge; cognitive agents will be ‘perfect logicians’, i.e. they have infinitive capability of logical inference. Hintikka calls the argument for KK from the strong notion of knowledge as the ‘transcendental argument’ for KK. Obviously, the strong notion of knowledge is far away from our ordinary conception of knowledge; based on such a strong sense of knowledge, epistemic logic has met the problem of logical omnipotence, and is difficult to apply in our ordinary cognitive practice. Moreover, there is no close connection of the KK principle with internalism or externalism
Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Knowledge and Belief
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle
If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised
Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth
An Interview with Timothy Williamson
Knowledge in a Social World
Knowledge from Falsehood
Knowing (How It Is) That P
Self-knowledge and the KK principle
Knowing that one knows? reviewed
The problem of logical omniscience, I
Knowledge’s Boundary Problem
Knowing that one knows and the classical definition of knowledge
Addressing two recent challenges to the factive account of knowledge
The Myth of Factive Verbs
Mythology of the Factive
Iteration Principles in Epistemology I
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |