Buridan’s Theory of Consequences

Bibliographic Data

ID21451387
AuthorsWolfgang Lenzen (0000-0002-5456-1685, Osnabrück University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume46
Issue3
Pages340-364
Publication date2025-07-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory and Philosophy of Logic (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0144-5340 • E-ISSN: 1464-5149
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01445340.2024.2377528
OpenAlexW4401345205
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited21

Buridan endorses the basic idea that q follows from p iff it is impossible that p is true but q is false. Since he also accepts the law that, if p is impossible, the conjunction (p ∧ q) must be impossible, he comes to regard the principle ‘Ex impossibili quodlibet’ (EIQ) as basically correct. However, his logic is based on a ‘nominalist’ view according to which propositions are tokens of spoken, written or thought language existing in space of time, and the truth of such a proposition presupposes that it exists. This conception prompted Buridan to modify the definition of ‘consequence’, but none of his attempts was fully successful. Yet, a large part of his theory of consequences is based on the usual account of necessary truth-conservation. As regards principle EIQ, Buridan distinguishes two variants of impossibility. Proposition p is possible iff the state of affairs as described by p is possible; this doesn’t guarantee, however, that p is ‘possibly true’. E.g. ‘No proposition is negative’ is considered by Buridan as describing a possible state of affairs, but this proposition is not possibly true, because in order to be true, it would have to exist, and as soon as it comes into existence, it becomes false. Accordingly, EIQ requires that the antecedent p is really impossible and not only impossibly true

Epistemology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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