Embedded courts under campaign-style enforcement
How top-down reforms reshape conditional justice in China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21451690 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chao Ma (0000-0001-7181-5109, University of International Business and Economics), Chi-Ying Cheng (0000-0002-4488-2450, Birkbeck, University of London, corresponding author), Chao-yo Cheng |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 86 |
| Pages | 106331 |
| Publication date | 2026-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Review of Law and Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0144-8188 • E-ISSN: 1873-6394 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.irle.2026.106331 |
| OpenAlex | W7131213600 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 42 |
Drawing on over 360,000 Chinese court records, we employ a regression discontinuity in time (RDiT) design to examine a top-down reform intended to prevent local governments from pressuring courts to decline administrative litigation cases upon submission. We find that while the total number of cases spiked briefly following the reform, increases in the volume of sensitive land-related disputes have remained stable. Meanwhile, although cases are increasingly dismissed without a formal judgment, plaintiffs who reach trial are significantly more likely to win. Combining quantitative results with qualitative evidence, we argue that Chinese local courts strategically utilize top-down mandates to pursue a subnational separation of powers. Such campaign-style reforms can produce lasting change by allowing the judiciary to gain leverage over the executive branch. While citizens' access to justice remains subject to selective gatekeeping, the continued practice of conditional justice suggests a reduced political embeddedness of local courts
China · Economic Justice · Embeddedness · Leverage (statistics) · Plaintiff · Politics · Regression discontinuity design · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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| Highly cited | No |
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