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Behaviorally efficient remedies

An experiment

Bibliographic Data

ID21451766
AuthorsChristoph Engel (0000-0001-8451-3599), Lars Freund (Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics)
Year2026
Volume85
Pages106321
Publication date2026-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Review of Law and Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0144-8188 • E-ISSN: 1873-6394
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.irle.2026.106321
OpenAlexW3202078880
LanguageEN
References cited22

Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only give a right to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises, and fairness concerns. We find that there is indeed less trade if specific performance is not guaranteed, provided the preference for the traded commodity is sufficiently pronounced

Business · Commodity · Damages · Economics · Ex-ante · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Legal principles and applications

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Highly citedNo

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