Is Stalnaker’s Semantics Complete
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21461209 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander W Kocurek (0000-0002-0912-1488, University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1033-1041 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Erkenntnis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10670-025-00927-7 |
| OpenAlex | W4407674182 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
It is shown that one common formulation of Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals is incomplete: it has no sound and (strongly) complete proof system. At first, this seems to conflict with well-known completeness results for this semantics (e.g., Stalnaker and Thomason 1967, Stalnaker 1970 and Lewis 1973, ch. 6). As it turns out, it does not: these completeness results rely on another closely-related formulation of the semantics that is provably complete. Specifically, the difference comes down to how the Limit Assumption is stated. I close with some remarks about what this means for the logic of conditionals
Epistemology · Ontology · Programming language · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Highly cited | No |
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