Why Your Causal Intuitions are Corrupt

Intermediate and Enabling Variables

Bibliographic Data

ID21461622
AuthorsChristopher Clarke (0000-0002-6225-0115, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume89
Issue3
Pages1065-1093
Publication date2024-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueErkenntnis (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10670-022-00570-6
OpenAlexW4313646997
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited31

When evaluating theories of causation, intuitions should not play a decisive role, not even intuitions in flawlessly-designed thought experiments. Indeed, no coherent theory of causation can respect the typical person’s intuitions in redundancy (pre-emption) thought experiments, without disrespecting their intuitions in threat-and-saviour (switching/short-circuit) thought experiments. I provide a deductively sound argument for these claims. Amazingly, this argument assumes absolutely nothing about the nature of causation. I also provide a second argument, whose conclusion is even stronger: the typical person’s causal intuitions are thoroughly unreliable. This argument proceeds by raising the neglected question: in what respects is information about intermediate and enabling variables relevant to reliable causal judgment

Causation · Compatibilism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Nothing · Thought experiment · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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