How to Interpret Belief Hierarchies in Bayesian Game Theory
A Dilemma for the Epistemic Program
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21461634 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cyril Hédoin (0000-0002-5358-7111, Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Économie, Gestion, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 419-440 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Erkenntnis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10670-020-00360-y |
| OpenAlex | W3133491121 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 39 |
Dilemma · Epistemology · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Ontology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Philosophy
The Bounds of Reason
Convention
Understanding Institutions
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
Agreeing to Disagree
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
Belief revision in games
A Logical Framework for Convention
Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics
Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality
The bounds of reason
Convention
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |