Anti-Haecceitism and Fundamentality

Datos Bibliográficos

ID21461656
AutoresMaria Scarpati (University of Neuchâtel, autor de correspondencia)
Año2023
Volumen88
Número8
Páginas3221-3238
Fecha de publicación2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaErkenntnis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0165-0106 • E-ISSN: 1572-8420
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10670-021-00499-2
OpenAlexW4200152162
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas39

Is everything about reality either qualitative or somehow determined by the qualitative character of reality itself? Metaphysical anti-Haecceitism is often taken to be the claim that this is the case, and to entail that reality is fundamentally qualitative. In this paper, I (1) argue against the idea that metaphysical anti-Haecceitism should be characterized in such terms, and (2) defend a novel way to phrase such a view. This will be done by taking the main arguments for anti-Haecceitism as a guide and by singling out the proper commitments of a view that satisfies the desideratum set forth by such arguments. The phrasing I shall offer will help tell the issue of anti-Haecceitism apart from some concerns about fundamentality that, I will contend, are orthogonal to it—among them, the question whether there is fundamentality at all

Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Ontology · Phrase · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science