Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism

Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations

Bibliographic Data

ID21466957
AuthorsJesse Lopes (0000-0002-4659-0048, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume39
Issue1
Pages47-68
Publication date2023-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHusserl Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0167-9848 • E-ISSN: 1572-8501
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10743-022-09315-3
OpenAlexW4296453857
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited33

Ever since Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall presented Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (1982), the question of the relation of phenomenology to cognitive science has been, if not answered, at least discussed. Dreyfus tried to answer this question in terms of the work of Jerry Fodor. From a Husserlian "point of view," Dreyfus contended, "Fodor is rediscovering a very important discipline: the phenomenological theory of cognition, which Hume and Kant saw dimly and which Husserl brought into its own" ( This answer, however, proved to be very unpopular (though see Pokropski 2020), and was immediately rejected by Husserlians, both before

Epistemology · Linguistics · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History