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An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes

Bibliographic Data

ID21470331
AuthorsFlorian Brandl (0000-0002-3931-3931, Princeton University), Felix Brandt (0000-0002-4179-9897, corresponding author), Christian Stricker (0000-0002-6388-5235)
Year2022
Volume58
Issue1
Pages5-38
Publication date2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01326-x
OpenAlexW3175624739
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited36

Maximal lottery ( $$ ML $$ ML ) schemes constitute an interesting class of randomized voting rules that were proposed by Peter Fishburn in 1984 and have been repeatedly recommended for practical use. However, the subtle differences between different $$ ML $$ ML schemes are often overlooked. Two canonical subsets of $$ ML $$ ML schemes are "Image missing"schemes (which only depend on unweighted majority comparisons) and "Image missing"schemes (which only depend on weighted majority comparisons). We prove that "Image missing"schemes are the only homogeneous $$ ML $$ ML schemes that satisfy $$ SD $$ SD -efficiency and $$ SD $$ SD -participation, but are also among the most manipulable $$ ML $$ ML schemes. While all $$ ML $$ ML schemes are manipulable and even violate monotonicity, they are never manipulable when a Condorcet winner exists and satisfy a relative notion of monotonicity. We also evaluate the frequency of manipulable preference profiles and the degree of randomization of $$ ML $$ ML schemes via extensive computer simulations. In summary, $$ ML $$ ML schemes are rarely manipulable and often do not randomize at all, especially for few alternatives. The average degree of randomization of "Image missing"schemes is consistently lower than that of "Image missing"schemes

Algorithm · Machine learning · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Sports Analytics and Performance · Artificial Intelligence

  • Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions

    Open Access•Patrick Lederer•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

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    Peter C Fishburn•SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics•1977

  • The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game

    Open Access•Gilbert Laffond, Jean‐françois Laslier et al.•Games and Economic Behavior•1993

  • SSB Utility theory

    Open Access•P C Fishburn•Mathematical Social Sciences•1984

  • Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections

    Open Access•L Feld, Scott L Feld et al.•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1992

Unique citing works1
Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1
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