When citizens legalize drugs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21470873 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elena Lucchese (University of Milano-Bicocca), Paolo Roberti (0000-0002-2577-0154, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Pages | 102599 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0176-2680 • E-ISSN: 1873-5703 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102599 |
| OpenAlex | W4401831612 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
The demand for drug legalization is remarkably heterogeneous across countries and over time. A theory is presented to show that ruling politicians can influence this demand by choosing the level of enforcement of drug laws which will influence their exposure to drug use and their views on legalization. If legalization has, overall, expected social benefits, politicians opposed to it will adopt a higher level of law enforcement than politicians in favor. In this case, the level of law enforcement is excessive with respect to the optimal level. If instead, legalizing the drug has overall expected social costs, then the opposite will be the case. The examples of the Netherlands and the US are used to test the model
Business · Economics · Law and economics · Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology · HIV, Drug Use, Sexual Risk · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
| Highly cited | No |
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