Pragmatic Nonviolence

The terms “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” have caused trouble ever since William James adopted them as new names for some old ways of thinking. The trouble at times makes one wonder if C. S. Peirce's ugly “pragmaticism” might have caused less confusion. I knew from the moment I saw the title of Andrew Fitz-Gibbon's Pragmatic Nonviolence that the trouble might be in play. Pacifist and nonviolent literature often uses the term “pragmatic” with no reference to the American philosophical tradition. Pragmatic pacifism is a common term simply used to distinguish non-absolutist approaches to pacifism from absolutist approaches. Likewise, pragmatic has been used to modify nonviolence to distinguish it from purist commitments to non-harm. But the back cover of Fitz-Gibbon's slim volume put my fears to rest by clarifying that the work would draw from “the philosophy of nonviolence, the American pragmatist tradition and recent empirical research.” Or perhaps I should say that my fears were temporarily allayed since they reemerged as I waited for any sustained treatment of American pragmatism until page ninety-six.Fitz-Gibbon's project here is certainly admirable. He intends to sketch a philosophy of nonviolence that is accessible to readers and students who may not be familiar with the literature on nonviolence. He admits in the preface that the book “is not a complete or definitive argument; more like a developing set of ideas” (xiii). The dialogue format of the book seeks to draw the reader into an exploration of the ideas as they develop. While the book is not comprehensive, the reader will likely appreciate that Fitz-Gibbon begins at the very beginning, breaking down what he means by a “better world” and thinking through what violence and nonviolence are exactly. He offers helpful definitions and concise summaries of his arguments throughout. And he concludes with practical information about how and why nonviolence works. So, the book is truly a short philosophy of nonviolence that treats the subject systematically if not comprehensively, making it one of the few examples of a brief philosophy of nonviolence of which I am aware.Fitz-Gibbon's concise thesis is stated several times throughout the book: “Nonviolence is a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-being of the Other by refraining from violence and acting according to lovingkindness.” And this nonviolence has the potential to move us toward a better world where “we would see the effects of basic ethical theories of caring, non-harming, doing good for each other, greater fairness and respect for everyone's autonomy . . . In other words, it would be a world in which we would see an increase in human flourishing and happiness” (119). The recurring nature of the statement of this thesis might actually be effectively used as a teaching tool, because students can see quite explicitly how Fitz-Gibbon is building and supporting each part of the thesis. For example, as he begins a section on how nonviolence might be an antidote to violence, one of his characters summarizes the previous section on how violence spoils a better world, in which he helpfully clarifies all of the types of violence that he has in mind. “Violence, whether of the major kind like war and terrorism, or the more domestic like child or spousal abuse, or more systemic like patriarchy and racism . . . all those types of violence work against a better world” (66). Every part of the thesis is similarly pursued and the reader comes to understand what Fitz-Gibbon intends by just about every word. This would certainly be a model of clear argumentation worthy of study by undergraduate students.While the project and thesis are admirable, the book falls short in at least two major ways. First, let me return to the matter of Fitz-Gibbon's treatment and use of American, pragmatic philosophy. Not only does Fitz-Gibbon only turn to the tradition two-thirds of the way through the book, thereby already ensuring that the tradition will not shape his discussion very meaningfully, but his discussion of the tradition is thin at best. He cites James a few times and his readings are accurate enough, but he seems to rely on Michael Bacon's Pragmatism: An Introduction (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012) quite heavily. Occasionally, Fitz-Gibbon's characterizations of pragmatic philosophers move beyond overly simplistic to erroneous, as when he summarizes a comparison of Peirce and James with “For Peirce, then, philosophy is reduced to the natural sciences. For James, philosophy looks at every kind of practical effect” (107). Peirce gets especially rough treatment. Fitz-Gibbon repeatedly suggests that Peirce was only interested in scientific inquiry and even at times paints his thought as a precursor to logical positivism (105). Fitz-Gibbon moves well beyond a neglect for “the Neglected Argument” when he suggests, “whereas for Peirce any kind of religious idea was meaningless, James made room for religion” (106). Fitz-Gibbon seems to be unaware of the literature by Michael Raposa, Roger Ward, and others very familiar to AJTP readers that explains the formative role that religion plays in Peirce's thought and develops his thought for understanding religion.More importantly, I'm not convinced that Fitz-Gibbon needs the American pragmatist tradition at all. Mostly what he draws from the tradition is the basic idea that ideas and concepts should be judged by their practical value. His characters latch on to James's unfortunately consumerist phrase “cash value” and discuss how religious and philosophical ideas can have pragmatic effects that move a person toward nonviolence. The pacifism of James and Jane Addams are mentioned, but Fitz-Gibbon doesn't show the relation of pragmatic philosophy to these positions. Once this truncated takeaway is established, Fitz-Gibbon's characters quickly connect pragmatism to Aristotelian virtue ethics and Confucian and Taoist ideas about comportment. Oddly, this jarring move may represent the most pregnant of Fitz-Gibbon's developing ideas. There may yet be connections to be made between a pragmatic understanding of habits, dispositions, and self-cultivation and the nonviolent philosophies of Gandhi and others that are rooted in self-discipline and deep commitment to the practice of nonviolence. Fitz-Gibbon only hints in these directions. In the end, I'm not at all sure that one needs to cite the American pragmatic tradition simply to say that ideas have practical effects and should be judged thereby.The second major flaw has to do with genre. While the dialogue format of the book has the effect mentioned above of drawing the reader into ideas as they are developing, in the end, it is mostly distracting and muddling. Fitz-Gibbon clarifies in the “Preface” that the choice was made in part because students have made comments like, “I can understand the argument better when people are talking to each other, rather than in a convoluted sentence” (xiii). Fitz-Gibbon intends for the characters to represent different aspects of his own thought and he hopes that they are realistic such that the dialogue is meaningful. I found the characters’ chatter about the quality of the tea offered by the university food service and the parenthetical interruptions reporting that the speaker stopped to sip her wine superfluous. Sometimes the characters slipped into caricatures like when the daughter of Holocaust survivors peppers in Yiddish phrases like “oy vey” or the several times the Mennonite theologian asks that the philosophers catch her up on basic philosophical concepts like social contract. “Remember, Clayton, I'm only a theologian,” (85) she exclaims. But, in the end, I'm mostly not convinced that the little subtlety that the dialogue adds is worth sacrificing the clarity and ease of the tables and charts one finds in a good old introduction to peace studies text book. The simple thesis that the book puts forward could be just as well supported by good, brief chapters on types of violence, approaches to peace, and philosophies of nonviolence

Epistemology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Indian History and Philosophy · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification