Planning and Its Function in Our Lives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21497541 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael E Bratman (0000-0001-9424-3537, Philosophy Department Stanford University Stanford CA USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-15 |
| Publication date | 2024-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/japp.12693 |
| OpenAlex | W4387443100 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 24 |
Our capacity for planning agency is a core capacity that underlies interrelated forms of mind‐shaped practical organization: cross‐temporal organization of individual agency, shared agency, social rules, and rule‐guided organized institutions. A function of our capacity for planning agency is the support of these forms of practical organization. I highlight Peter Godfrey‐Smith's contrast between the ‘Wright function’ of something as ‘the effect it has which explains why it is there’ and ‘Cummins functions’ that ‘are capacities or effects of components of systems, which are salient in the explanation of capacities of the larger system’. Drawing on Paul Grice's strategy of ‘creature construction’, I articulate a sequence of nested constructions: from temporally extended planning agency to shared agency to shared policies to social rules to rule‐guided organized institutions. We see our capacity for planning agency as part of an explanation of how we achieve such practical organization, and as having nested Cummins functions of supporting those forms of organization. This sheds light on related ideas in H.L.A. Hart's theory of law, a challenge from J. David Velleman, the centrality of such forms of organization to the philosophy of action, and the moral and political significance of our capacity for planning agency
Centrality · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Salient · Sociology · Wright · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
The Present Functions and the Future Persistence of Planning Agency
How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's ‘Core Capacity Thesis’ and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences
Inequality in Planning Capacity
Functionalisms and the Philosophy of Action
Explaining collective agency
Anthropomorphism, False Beliefs, and Conversational AIs
The Birth of Ethics
Valuing and the Will
Shared Agency
The Concept of Law
The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm
Functional Analysis
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Shared Intention, Organized Institutions
Massively Shared Agency
Disadvantage
Counterfactual genealogy, speculative accuracy, & predicative drift
The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality
Functions
Functional Explanation and Virtual Selection
Walking Together
Risk, Responsibility, and Blame
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |