Reciprocity, Vulnerability, and the Moral Significance of Herd Immunity

Bibliographic Data

ID21497631
AuthorsJustin Bernstein (0000-0003-4837-5832, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands, corresponding author), Mark Navin (Oakland University Rochester Hills MI USA), Mark C Navin (0000-0002-8511-6517, Oakland University)
Year2023
Volume40
Issue4
Pages725-745
Publication date2023-08-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/japp.12671
OpenAlexW4380202882
LanguageEN
References cited33

This article proposes a novel defense of vaccine mandates: such policies are justifiable because they protect the capabilities of individuals who cannot cultivate individual immunity against infection. We begin by considering a nearby argument that has recently enjoyed popularity, which claims individuals have an enforceable obligation to get vaccinated because they have benefited from community protection (often referred to as ‘herd immunity’), and thus they ought to do their fair share in sustaining that public good by getting vaccinated. We object, however, that this kind of argument misstates the ethical basis for vaccine mandates because community protection primarily protects unvaccinated people. We contend that the duty to vaccinate is not fundamentally an obligation to make a fair contribution to a public good from which vaccinated people benefit, but a duty to protect the wellbeing of otherwise vulnerable third parties. We flesh out our view by drawing on Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach

Computer security · Duty · Duty to protect · Herd immunity · Law and economics · Moral obligation · Obligation · Political science · Popularity · Sociology · Law · Medicine · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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