A contractualist approach to threshold deontology

The case of ex-post regulatory changes

Bibliographic Data

ID21499012
AuthorsIttay Nissan-Rozen (0000-0001-8970-4300, Hebrew University, corresponding author), Noam Nisan (0000-0003-3106-6304, Hebrew University), Udi Nisan (Hebrew University)
Year2026
Volume42
Issue1
Pages71-90
Publication date2026-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomics and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0266-2671 • E-ISSN: 1474-0028
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0266267125000112
OpenAlexW4411070068
LanguageEN
References cited18

Common sense morality follows – in many cases – the prescriptions of threshold deontology. Governments, for example, are expected to follow their own rules, but in the face of an extreme price increase, public opinion has often supported changing the rules ex post to increase tax revenues. Such moral license in extreme situations is puzzling from a philosophical and an economic point of view. We present a simple contractualist solution to this puzzle using a game-theoretic model. We argue that allowing for deviations from the social contract in extreme circumstances is a necessary condition for the stability of any social contract

Deontological ethics · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Philosophy · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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