Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism

Bibliographic Data

ID21499050
AuthorsKasper Lippert‐rasmussen (0000-0003-0950-0215, Aarhus University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume39
Issue3
Pages373-394
Publication date2023-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomics and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0266-2671 • E-ISSN: 1474-0028
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0266267122000220
OpenAlexW4291781134
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited23

This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich and poor people, are inapplicable. Second, it specifies the sense in which, politically speaking, we should relate as equals, and in doing provides a richer version of recent relational egalitarian accounts of the ideal of democracy

Complaint · Democracy · Economics · Egalitarianism · Inequality · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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