Intention as practical memory and the tasks of action theory
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21501759 |
|---|---|
| Autores | M Kelley (0000-0001-5131-0525, Department of Philosophy University of Chicago Chicago Illinois USA, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Volumen | 41 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 425-431 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.70052 |
| OpenAlex | W7164330915 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 10 |
In this paper, I raise two challenges to Wayne Wu's proposal that intentions are practical memories. The first questions whether practical memories possess the functional roles that Michael Bratman's influential planning theory identifies for intention. The second suggests that a conception of intention as practical memory obscures the logic of intention in our ordinary ethical thought and talk. Both challenges are grounded in methodological reflections on the sources of disagreement in the philosophy of action
Grounded theory · Philosophy of mind · Theory of mind · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |