Rainbow's end
The structure, character, and content of conscious experience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501769 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brandon James Ashby (0000-0002-9897-9733, Philosophy Department University of Arizona Tucson Arizona USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 395-413 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12316 |
| OpenAlex | W3095844311 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 18 |
Separatism, representationalism, and phenomenal intentionalism are the primary views on the relationship between the phenomenality and intentionality of experience. I defend a novel position that is incompatible with separatism, can enrich representationalism and phenomenal intentionalism, but can also be accepted independently of those views. I call it phenomenal schematics : The phenomenal characters of our experiences have structures that place a priori, formal, and sometimes semantic constraints on our experience's possible intentional contents. Phenomenal structures are like the grammar of a language (or the compositional rules governing maps, models, and diagrams). Unlike words, however, phenomenal characters possess their “grammatical properties” essentially
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Gestalt psychology · Grammar · Intentionality · Linguistics · Perception · Schematic · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |