Whither extensions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501771 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Pereplyotchik (0000-0002-4609-9574, Department of Philosophy, Kent State University (Kent Campus) Kent State University Kent Ohio, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 237-250 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12271 |
| OpenAlex | W4237053373 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 8 |
Paul Pietroski develops an iconoclastic account of linguistic meaning. Here, I invite him to say more about what it implies about the relations between language, truth, and conceptual content. Readers concerned with securing the objectivity of conceptual thought may be worried about his claims that typical concepts “have no extensions” and that they “fit one another better than they fit the world.” Others might applaud his anti‐extensionalism in natural‐language semantics but fear that his account re‐raises familiar problems about extensions at the level of psychology
Epistemology · Linguistics · Natural language · Principle of compositionality · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |