Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21501776 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jie Gao (0000-0002-9523-4541, School of Philosophy Zhejiang University Hangzhou China, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1238-1257 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Mind & Language (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0268-1064 • E-ISSN: 1468-0017 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12451 |
| OpenAlex | W4312191314 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 58 |
According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p . However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical factors
Credence · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Machine learning · Proposition · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Probabilistic Knowledge
Who Is Rational?
Logic of Statistical Inference
Rationality for Mortals
Justifying Conditionalization
IX—Moral Encroachment
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning
On the reality of cognitive illusions.
Resource-rational analysis
Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks
Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions
Support theory
Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment
Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment
Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization
Credal sensitivism
Group members' reactions to opinion deviates and conformists at varying degrees of proximity to decision deadline and of environmental noise
Facts versus fears
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
Fencing Out Pragmatic Encroachment1
Belief and certainty
Axiomatic rationality and ecological rationality
The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Perception and Probability
Motivated augmentation and reduction of the overattribution bias
Motivated resistance and openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information
Rationality Disputes - Psychology and Epistemology
Risk as feelings
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |